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The objective of this study is to examine the role of surface water quality for the
decisions by Swedish municipalities to adopt environmental targets and action
plans, as well as allocating these decisions to a responsible authority. To this end,
we assess how environmental, socioeconomic, and political factors, as well as the
availability of environmental expertise, affect these municipal decisions.
Questionnaire data from the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions,
in combination with environmental monitoring data and official statistics, are used
for the econometric analysis. Results show that: (i) municipalities with bad water
quality, greater coastal length, and higher income are more inclined to adopt local
policies; (ii) collaboration with interest groups increases the likelihood of adopting
local policies; and (iii) municipalities with high Center Party representation tend to
set responsibility for environmental policy with the municipal council board.
KEYWORDS: environmental expertise; local environmental policy; logistic
regression; stakeholder participation; Water Framework Directive
1. Introduction
The European Union Water Framework Directive (WFD) of 2000 (2000/60/EC) requires
that surface water quality is managed at the river basin level, implying that policy deci-
sions are taken at a regional or local level. The WFD further requires the development
of river basin management plans that should outline the set of measures required to
achieve good ecological status for all water bodies. In the context of Sweden, five
regional Water Authorities were announced. Despite these authorities being responsible
for the development of environmental targets and action plans, they have neither the
authority over policy instruments nor the funds to subsidize measures (Hammer et al.
2011; Andersson, Petersson, and Jarsj€o 2012). For the WFD to have an effect, it is
therefore necessary for the local governments, that is, the municipalities, to take action.
This was foreseen at an early stage where the national government claimed that the
WFD should imply a considerably stronger role for water in municipal physical planning
and pointed out that the municipalities shall comply with agreed environmental goals
introduced by higher level governments (Government 2002). However, implementation
at the municipality level is, in principle, voluntary due to the lack of sanctions and other
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consequences in the case of non-compliance (Gooch and Baggett 2013; Voulvoulis,
Arpon, and Giakoumis 2017). A local government’s decision on whether to adopt an
environmental target or policy can therefore be expected to be determined by the per-
ceived benefits and costs, as well as institutional and political conditions that facilitate
or hinder implementation at the local level (Martin-Ortega et al. 2014).
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the role of surface water quality for the
implementation of environmental objectives in Swedish municipalities. We conjecture
that water quality plays a particularly important role in this context because of require-
ments posed by the WFD and the observation that water quality is often seen as a
main indicator of the effectiveness of local environmental policy and planning
(Burstrom et al. 1997; Hammer et al. 2011). We hypothesize that the adoption of local
environmental goals and action plans is determined by the environmental benefits that
accrue from their implementation and access to environmental expertise for their
development. To analyze these issues, we apply a revealed preferences approach where
we investigate how implementation outcomes depend on the potential benefits, access
to expertise, stakeholder participation and political representation in the municipal
council. Here, we take into account that access to expertise could be enhanced during
the process by appointing a responsible body with high professional competence. Data
on implementation are obtained from a questionnaire1 carried out by the Swedish
Association of Local Authorities and Regions (SKL) in 2011 (SKL 2012), which is
complemented by data from official statistics and publicly available databases.
The previous literature relevant to our study is that which examines policymakers’
actual decisions on environmental policy and infers the criteria that determined these
choices (McFadden 1976). Such studies of revealed preferences carry out a positive ana-
lysis of past governmental choices. Thus, the method does not presuppose that govern-
ments act in a socially optimal manner, but rather helps to understand the relative
importance of societal costs and benefits, institutional factors, and stakeholder influence
for policy decisions taken. Several studies have applied the revealed preferences method
to policymakers’ decisions on projects and actions to improve water quality. For
example, the study by Magat, Krupnick, and Harrington (2013) suggests that the EPA
places little weight on economic efficiency when setting standards for water pollutants;
instead decisions are mainly determined by the strength of the trade association repre-
senting the affected industry, and the profitability of the industry. Helland (1998) ana-
lyzes the revealed preferences of state-level EPAs showing that budgetary resources and
the viability of the local economy affect enforcement of the Clean Water Act. Berrens
et al. (1999), in the context of New Mexico, show that it is not just environmental risk
that affects decisions for underground storage tanks; local economic and social factors
are also important, and the threat of leakage. In the context of the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Fernandez (2004) analyzes how environmental project
attributes influence a NAFTA institution’s approval for their implementation. Elofsson
and von Br€omssen (2017) evaluate the determinants of the implementation of nutrient
abatement measures in the Baltic Sea countries, accounting for the type of pollutants
addressed, policy instrument choice as well as financial and institutional capacity. For
the present study, the revealed preferences approach is relevant because of the complex
nature of municipalities’ decisions on environmental policy implementation, in combin-
ation with our aim to identify the role that water quality has played in decisions taken.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we provide a
more detailed background and present our hypotheses. In Section 3, we outline the
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econometric model, and provide a description of the data. Section 4 presents the
results, and Section 5 provides a discussion and concluding remarks.
2. Background and hypotheses
At the national level, the Swedish parliament has adopted 16 environmental quality
objectives, which should be met by the year 2020. Despite progress in many areas,
these targets are not likely to be met on the set date (EPA 2018). For the objective
‘Zero Eutrophication’, which is relevant to surface water quality, the EPA observes
that the objective cannot be achieved with the present set of national policy instru-
ments and measures. The situation is argued to be due to inadequate water and sewer-
age pricing policies, high costs for meeting the ambitious targets, difficulties in
distributing these costs among sectors and stakeholders, complexity of government
structures, and potential political backlash (Keenleyside et al. 2009; Kirschke et al.
2017). To enhance the probability of success, the Swedish EPA recommends that local
authorities take ownership of environmental targets and policy design, and encourage
environmental interest groups, business, and the public to participate in the decision
process (Weichelt 2009; EPA 2012a, 2012b).
Sweden has a long history of constitutionally guaranteed local autonomy, with
greater authority than most other European countries (Hysing 2009). Local municipal-
ities decide upon spatial planning, sewage, and wastewater management; however,
they are obliged to follow national environmental mandates and laws (J€orby 2002).
Increasingly, local authorities have adapted national and regional environmental tar-
gets, as well as action plans, for their own local situations. At best, such decentraliza-
tion of environmental policymaking can imply enhanced economic efficiency and
democratic accountability, for example, if local policymakers have better information
on local preferences and greater discretion to efficiently tailor implementation to local
conditions (Uphoff 1992).
In this paper, we put forward three hypotheses regarding the development of envir-
onmental policy at the municipality level: (i) the level of implementation of environ-
mental policy is determined by the associated local environmental and social benefits
and costs; (ii) the need for, and availability of, environmental expertise affects the
level of implementation and the allocation of the responsibility for implementation;
and (iii) stakeholder participation and political representation can increase or decrease
the level of implementation, depending on the type of interests represented. This sec-
tion first discusses measurement of policy implementation, then outlines the hypothe-
ses in further detail.
2.1. Measuring implementation of environmental policy
Implementation of environmental policy could be measured through the outputs
achieved in terms of binding decisions or plans and their level of stringency, the oper-
ationalization of these outputs in terms of actions and measures undertaken with the
aim of meeting the agreed objectives, and the environmental outcomes in terms of the
resulting change in the state of the environment (Koontz and Thomas 2006; Newig
et al. 2018). In this study, we define implementation in terms of the existence of
agreed local environmental targets and action plans; that is, our measure falls within
the first of the above categories. Moreover, the process of developing goals and action
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plans could be more or less interlinked, and we therefore consider the possibility that
the two outcomes are separately or jointly determined. Thus, our analysis provides
knowledge about the ambitions of local governments in the first step of the environ-
mental policy implementation process, the establishment of goals and plans, while we
do not account for the later stages where policymakers decide on the allocation of
resources, ensure that physical action is undertaken, and follow up on the resulting
environmental effects.
2.2. Local benefits and costs of environmental policy
Policymakers who strive to maximize citizen welfare should consider the costs and
benefits of their decisions. If damage from pollution is increasing at an increasing rate,
which is typically assumed in economics (Shortle, Abler, and Horan 1998), the pres-
ence of higher pollutant concentrations implies greater benefits from the implementa-
tion of environmental policy, ceteris paribus. Also, low water quality implies that
greater efforts are necessary to meet WFD targets. A large water area and a high
length of coastline can be expected to imply that the status of waters is relatively more
important to local citizens because of the potentially greater role of water quality in
the provision of recreational and amenity benefits. We therefore hypothesize that low
water quality, large water area, and a high length of coastline would increase the pro-
pensity of municipalities to implement local environmental policies.
Furthermore, we hypothesize that municipalities with larger areas of protected nat-
ural land have a higher likelihood of implementing more stringent local environmental
policies. There are larger ecological values at stake in natural reserves than on other
land, and the recreational benefits provided can be considerable, motivating the need
for a more ambitious local environmental policy. We hypothesize that the political
pressure from higher governmental levels, due to the requirements from the WFD,
implies that water quality plays a more important role in local environmental policy
implementation than areas of protected natural land, where there is no corresponding
EU regulation requiring, for example, a specific status of the land to be achieved at a
given point in time.
The benefits of implementing local environmental policy will be higher if the
population in the municipality is larger, ceteris paribus, because environmental quality
is a public good and a greater number of people will derive utility from the environ-
mental improvements achieved. A larger population can also imply greater pressure on
water quality and environmental amenities (Granvik et al. 2015; COS 2016), implying
that the environmental damage is greater, which further strengthens the need for devel-
oping local environmental policy. Higher average income is typically associated with a
higher willingness-to-pay for environmental improvements (Barbier, Czajkowski, and
Hanley 2017). If the average income is high, this also means that the municipality has
a higher amount of resources and, hence, a greater capacity to pay for local environ-
mental policy (Bulkeley and Betsill 2005; Levesque, Bell, and Calhoun 2017; Dax and
Fischer 2018).
2.3. The need for environmental expertise
The development of environmental targets and plans requires adequate environmental
competency (Dinar, Rosegrant, and Meinzen-Dick 1997; Bulkeley and Betsill 2005).
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The knowledge base for decisions could be strengthened through incorporating envir-
onmental expertise within the decision process, thereby enhancing policy outputs as
well as their implementability (Newig et al. 2018). This can be achieved by having
expertise within the staff involved in the policy work (Levesque, Bell, and Calhoun
2017), or by consulting external expertise. The choice of unit conducting policy deci-
sions matters for the availability of expertise. If decisions are taken by managers who
can be considered professional experts, mainly driven by professional ideals and career
promotion, this could increase the likelihood of policies that support sustainability
(Levesque, Bell, and Calhoun 2017).
Here, we consider two alternative ways for local policymakers to increase access
to expertise in the development of environmental targets and plans. The first is by
cooperating with the county administrative board, which typically has a considerable
number of staff with professional expertise in environmental issues of different kinds
(Eckerberg and Mineur 2003; Andersson, Petersson, and Jarsj€o 2012). The second is
for the municipal council to delegate the responsibility for the development of environ-
mental targets and plans to committees at a lower level in the municipal organization,
such as environmental or building committees. These committees have further profes-
sional expertise in their respective areas including, for example, competence in envir-
onmental, ecological, engineering, and spatial planning issues. If targets and plans are,
instead, decided by the municipality board, this risks yielding slower and less appropri-
ate outcomes (Uphoff 1992; S€oderberg 2016; Warwick 2017). We therefore hypothe-
size that cooperation with the county administrative board, and delegation of
responsibility to lower level committees positively affect the likelihood of the local
government developing environmental policy.
In addition, municipalities’ choice to allocate the responsibility for environmental
policies to the council board or the lower level committees could itself be a variable,
which is determined by the degree of complexity of the environmental issues. For
example, water quality problems are typically due to pollution from known sources
within the municipality, such as agriculture and wastewater treatment plants. Issues on
biodiversity management are more complex, as biodiversity can only be supported by
indirect measures and is strongly dependent on developments outside the municipality.
The management of protected land can, therefore, require specific ecological expertise,
while water quality could potentially be seen as a less complex issue. Moreover, the
WFD implies pressure on local politicians to show that they engage in, and are able to
comply with, the requirements posed. Taken together, municipalities with relatively
large water quality problems could be expected to allocate the responsibility to the
municipality council, whereas municipalities with large areas of protected land could
be expected to allocate the responsibility to professional officials’ level.
2.4. Stakeholder participation and political representation
Collaboration with environmental interest groups and local enterprises potentially
affects the municipalities’ decision on environmental policy. Such collaboration is typ-
ically seen as an important part of the policy process and is encouraged both within
the framework of the WFD and by the Swedish EPA. Despite this, such collaboration
is often lacking (B€ackstrand 2006; Leach 2006; Gunningham 2009). If successful, col-
laboration can contribute to individual and collective learning, awareness raising, pol-
icy acceptance, conflict resolution, and trust-building; however, if unsuccessful,
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collaboration risks eroding trust among policymakers and stakeholders, alienating the
public, and triggering new conflicts (Newig et al. 2018).
Environmental interest groups, which are likely to participate in collaboration, have
relatively stronger preferences for high environmental quality compared to the average
citizen, and are argued to be able to monitor environmental conditions, inform policy-
makers, and hold local politicians accountable for the situation through electoral proc-
esses (Seabright 1996; World Bank 2000; Kochsk€amper et al. 2016). We hypothesize
that collaboration with environmental interest groups positively affects the likelihood
of local environmental policy being developed.
Collaboration with industry and enterprises can be an obstacle to the development
of local environmental policy if the companies contribute to pollution and affect land
use in a way that is negative for the environment, while at the same time, policy-
makers are concerned about the economic viability of the enterprises in question
(Cropper et al. 1992; Eckerberg 1997; D’Uva 2017). The agricultural sector is a major
source of water pollution, and the WFD has increased demands for farmers to reduce
the release of nutrients into watercourses (Andersson 2004). Locally issued restrictions
on farmers’ practices are generally not entitled to compensation and can, therefore, be
expensive for farmers. Ambiguities also exist within locally developed demands placed
on farmers which further hampers support amongst the farming community
(Christensen and Kørnøv 2011). This suggests that farmers could be inclined to resist
increased stringency of local environmental policy.
Environmentally oriented political parties can also act to increase the stringency of
local environmental policy (e.g., Levesque, Bell, and Calhoun 2017). In the Swedish
context, the Center Party and the Green Party are typically characterized as more
environmentally oriented than other parties (Brandt, Burstr€om, and Frostell 1999;
Jamison 2003; Carter 2007; Linde 2010). Both parties, arguably, prefer more decentral-
ized environmental policy with goal setting and monitoring to be carried out at the
local level (Kirchg€assner and Schneider 2002, Linde 2010). Political ideology differen-
ces between the two parties are a point of discussion, where the Green Party often has
positions ranging from the middle to left of the right-left spectrum (Bennulf and
Holmberg 1990; Jahn 1993; Folke 2014), while the Center Party has a history of
cooperation with both conservative and left-wing parties on the municipal level
(Bennulf and Holmberg 1990; Jahn 1993; Folke 2014). The Center Party tends to resist
direct controls for environmental problems issued at the national level, whilst compro-
mising locally with left parties based on local conditions (Goldfield 1982). We there-
fore hypothesize that a higher proportion of elected municipal council officials from
these two parties is associated with a higher level of environmental policy
implementation.
In addition, political representation could affect the decision to allocate responsibil-
ity for environmental policy to the municipal board or professional officials. When
policies are decided by politicians who rely on political support to be re-elected, the
politicians may be inclined to prefer policies that improve the conditions for important
voter groups and the reputation of the politician (Levesque, Bell, and Calhoun 2017).
Policies decided by lower level committees may receive less attention among the local
voters, compared to policies developed by the municipal council itself. Due to the
lower visibility, decisions by lower level committees might not enhance the prospects
for re-election of politicians belonging to parties placing strong emphasis on environ-
mental issues. Thus, delegation may be less preferred by parties for which it is
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important to show their voter groups that they contribute to the development of envir-
onmental policy. We therefore hypothesize that a larger representation of parties with
a green profile increases the likelihood that environmental policy decisions are taken
by the municipal board.
3. Model and data description
We are interested in studying the adoption of local environmental targets and plans,
which could be decided separately or jointly. For this purpose, we first use logistic
(logit) regressions to analyze the municipalities’ choices of whether to introduce local
environmental goals and action plans, treating these as separate decisions.
Subsequently, we categorize municipalities regarding whether they have adopted both
local targets and plans, only one of these, or none. These categories can be viewed as
indicating different levels of ambition. We employ a multinomial logit model estima-
tion to analyze factors that explain the category to which municipalities belong. The
choice to allocate the responsibility for decisions to the political or manager level is a
binary one and is analyzed using a logistic regression.
3.1. Modelling approach
The logit model employed employs certain sets of binary outcome variables, denoted
by yi; such that:
yi ¼ 1 with probability p0 with probability 1p

(1)
Here, the binary outcome variables have been obtained from a survey carried out by
the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions (SKL 2012) detailing deci-
sions on environmental policy made by Swedish municipalities. Specifically, regres-
sions are conducted to investigate choices by municipalities on whether to introduce
local environmental goals, denoted by ‘Goal’, local action plans, denoted by
‘ActionPlan’, and whether to allocate the responsibility for these to a given municipal
body, denoted by ‘Responsibility’. These three policy variables are all dependent varia-
bles in our regressions. The likelihood of a decision outcome is estimated using the
following logistic regression model:
logit P Yij ¼ 1ð Þ½  ¼ aþ b1Oxyj þ b2WAreaj þ b3NRAreaj þ b4Coastj þ b5Popj
þb6AvIncj þ b7Responsibilityj þ b8Countyj þ b9IntGroupsj þ b10Businessj
þb11Farmsj þ b12FAreaj þ b13Centerj þ b14Greenj þ ei (2)
where Yij denotes the municipal decision for measure i, where I ¼ ‘Goal’,
‘ActionPlan’, ‘Responsibility’, in municipality j. For example, if municipality j has
adopted their own local environmental goals, Yij equals one if the municipality has
adopted a local goal, and zero if not. We include environmental, socioeconomic, envir-
onmental expertise, as well as stakeholder participation and political representation as
explanatory variables. The environmental variables included are: the average dissolved
oxygen concentration in water bodies, ‘Oxy’, where a higher oxygen concentration
indicates better water quality2 (Kannel et al. 2007; Sanchez et al. 2007); total surface
water area, ‘WArea’; the total area of nature reserve land, ‘NRArea’; and the coastal
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length for each municipality, ‘Coast’. In addition to these, we also consider socioeco-
nomic conditions through the inclusion of population, ‘Pop’, and average per capita
income, ‘AvInc’.
The effect of environmental expertise is accounted for by including a binary vari-
able for cooperation with the county administration, ‘County’, and by considering
whether the decision to adopt goals and plans is affected by the assigned responsible
body, reflected in the binary variable ‘Responsibility’.3 Finally, a number of variables
are included reflecting the involvement of stakeholders in policy development, includ-
ing binary variables for collaboration with interest groups, ‘IntGroups’, and the busi-
ness sector, ‘Business’. Furthermore, we include the number of farms within the
municipality, ‘Farms’, and the area of agricultural land, ‘FArea’, where both are
assumed to be proxies for the political power of the agricultural industry. We also test
the effects of political representation within the municipal council of the Center Party,
denoted by ‘Center’, and the Green Party, denoted by ‘Green’ as a proxy for their
influence on policy development.
For each explanatory variable we calculate the marginal effects which show the
effect on the likelihood of each different outcome from a change in the explanatory
variables. These are obtained through measuring the partial derivative w.r.t. for each
explanatory variable given by the expression: @p=@xj:
Subsequently, a multinomial logit estimation is conducted where we simultaneously
consider the choice to introduce goals and action plans. This multinomial logit estima-
tion is modelled with three levels in the response variable. Using the example of esti-
mating the choices for the dependent variable ‘Goal’ based on the choice for
‘ActionPlan’, this can be visualized as seen below in Equation (3):
Group 3 ¼ ‘Yes’ for Goal and ‘Yes’ for ActionPlan
Group 2 ¼ ‘Yes’ for Goal and ‘No’ for ActionPlan
‘No’ for Goal and ‘Yes’ for ActionPlan

Group 1 ¼ ‘No’ for Goal and ‘No’ for ActionPlan (3)
Here, Group 1 is given as the reference label (or base outcome). The econometric
equation can thus be given as
ln
P Zij ¼ 3ð Þ
P Zij ¼ 1ð Þ
" #
¼ aþ b1Oxyj þ b2WAreaj þ b3NRAreaj þ b4Coastj þ b5Popj
þb6AvIncj þ b7Responsibilityj þ b8Countyj þ b9IntGroupsj þ b10Businessj
þb11Farmsj þ b12FAreaj þ b13Centerj þ b14Greenj þ ei (4)
where Zij is the multinomial policy choice as explained above. The same principle is
also used for P Zij ¼ 2ð Þ with P Zij ¼ 1ð Þ being the base outcome. From this estimation,
we calculate the marginal effects from each multinomial group, see Equation (3).
3.2. Description of the data – dependent variables
Our dependent variables were obtained from a survey4 of 270 Swedish municipalities
carried out in 2011. The dependent variables in the logistic regressions are all binary.
The variable ‘Goal’ takes a value of 1 when the municipality has developed their own
local environmental goals and 0 otherwise. For the second dependent variable,
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‘ActionPlan’, a value of 1 indicates that the municipality has adopted an action plan,
and 0 otherwise. Finally, for the third dependent variable, ‘Responsibility’, a value of
1 indicates that the main responsibility for environmental goals lies with the municipal
council board, and 0 that the responsibility lies with lower level committees, for
example, is delegated to the environment and building committee, the municipal build-
ing board, or some other committee.
3.3. Description of the data – explanatory variables
Data for the environmental, socioeconomic, and political variables were obtained from
publicly available sources, and apply to the year 2011. Environmental data includes
data on dissolved oxygen content in surface water bodies, ‘Oxy’, collected from the
Environmental Database5 managed by the Swedish University of Agricultural
Sciences. We use the dissolved oxygen content, measured in mg O2/l, averaged over
all monitoring stations in the municipality over the year 2011. Data for the water area,
‘WArea’, and nature reserve area, ‘NRArea’, measured in km2 and hectares, respect-
ively, were collected from the Statistics Sweden (SCB) database. Finally, data for the
coastal length of each municipality, ‘Coast’, was collected from the SCB database and
is measured in kilometers. Population, ‘Pop’, and average net income6 per capita in
thousand SEK7 within the municipality among citizens aged 16þ per year, ‘AvInc’
were collected from the SCB8 database.
Regarding expertise, data on the interaction with the county administration were
obtained from the SKL survey and reflects whether the county administration have
assisted the municipality when developing targets and action plans. The variable
‘County’ takes a value of 1 when the municipality was assisted by the county adminis-
tration, and 0 otherwise.
Data on stakeholder involvement, including collaboration with local interest groups
(‘IntGroups’) and local private businesses (‘Business’), have been obtained from the
SKL survey, and are binary variables. The variables take a value of 1 when there has
been collaboration, and 0 otherwise. Data on the number of farms, ‘Farms’, are as of
2010 which is the nearest available year. These, as well as the data on farm area,
‘FArea’, were collected from the Swedish Board of Agriculture.9
Data on political representation of the Swedish Center and Green parties were col-
lected from the Swedish Election Authority,10 and expresses the share of seats in the
municipal council. Elections are held every fourth year, and data expresses the situ-
ation after the election in 2010. A summary of descriptive statistics for each variable
discussed can be seen in Table 1.
4. Results
This section details the results from estimations of the empirical model and the associ-
ated marginal effects. For each dependent variable, three models are estimated: Model
1 includes the main environmental and socioeconomic variables, Model 2 also includes
variables reflecting the inclusion of expertise in the policy process, that is, cooperation
with the county administration as well as the variable ‘Responsibility’ for the estima-
tions with ‘Goal’ and ‘ActionPlan’ as dependent variables. Finally, Model 3 adds
stakeholder variables: collaboration with interest groups and local business, the number
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of farms, the area of farm land, and representation of the Center and Green parties on
municipal council boards.
For logged values, percentage changes are obtained by converting from logarithmic
forms. When multiple models display significance, we focus the discussion on the esti-
mated effect in the model that includes the greatest number of available explanatory
variables, which has also (in all cases) the highest score for the quality of the model,
represented by the lowest Akaike information criterion (AIC) value, as seen in the
Appendix, Tables A1, A2, A3 and A4 (online supplemental data), which display
results from the initial logistic and multinomial logistic regressions. The section con-
cludes with post-estimation checks.
4.1. When do municipalities have environmental goals?
Water quality matters for municipalities’ choice to adopt environmental goals. The
marginal effect of dissolved oxygen content (Oxy) on ‘Goal’ is significant at the 1%
level in Models 1 and 2, but at the 5% level in Model 3, see Table 2. With a negative
sign, this implies that as the oxygen level increases by 1mg/l O2, the likelihood of
adopting local environmental goals decreases by 0.077%, from Model 3. No signifi-
cance is observed for population, the area of water and nature reserve land, or
coastal length.
A less robust outcome is seen for average income as ‘AvInc’ is significant at the
5% level within Models 1 and 2, but loses significance when adding stakeholder varia-
bles. From Model 2, results suggest that an increase in average income by 1,000 SEK
would lead to an increased likelihood of 4.2% of adopting local environmental goals.
This would imply that higher income increases the likelihood of adopting local goals.
No statistical significance is observed for the variables reflecting the inclusion
of expertise.
Considering collaboration with stakeholders, the marginal effect of ‘IntGroups’ is
significant at the 1% level in Model 3. With a positive coefficient, this implies that
cooperation with local organizations and interest groups increases the likelihood of
adopting local environmental goals by 0.27%. Furthermore, the number of farms is sig-
nificant at the 5% level. With a negative coefficient, this implies that an increase by
one farm would lead to a decreased likelihood of 1.29% for adoption of goals. The
surface area of farmland is also significant at the 10% level. With a positive coeffi-
cient, this implies that an increase in farmland by 1 km2 increases the likelihood by
1.17%. No significance is observed for collaboration with businesses or political repre-
sentation of the Center and Green parties.
4.2. When do municipalities have local environmental action plans?
Water quality also matters for municipalities’ choice to adopt action plans. The marginal
effects of dissolved oxygen content are significant at the 1% level in Models 1 and 2
and at the 10% level in Model 3, see Table 2. From Model 3, with a negative sign, this
implies that as the oxygen level increases by 1mg/l O2, this causes a decrease in the
likelihood of having an action plan by 0.06%. No significance is observed for the area
of water and nature reserve land, coastal length, or population levels.
As for ‘Goal’, a less robust result is seen for average income where results show
significance at the 5% and 10% level in Models 1 and 2, respectively, implying that
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an increase in average income by 1,000 SEK increases the likelihood of an action plan
by 2.3% (given in Model 2). As with ’Goal’, no statistical significance is seen for the
variables concerning expertise.
The marginal effects of collaboration with interest groups is significant at the 5%
level. With a positive coefficient, this implies that the presence of such collaboration
increases the likelihood of having adopted an action plan by 0.27%. No significance is
observed for collaboration with businesses, the number of farms, area of farmland, as
well as political representation of the Center and Green parties.
4.3. When do municipalities have both local environmental goals and action plans?
When local environmental goals and action plans are considered as a joint decision,
see Equation (4), results indicate an even stronger role for environmental conditions,
see Table 3. Oxygen content is significant at the 1% level within Models 1 and 2 and
at the 5% level for Model 3 within Group 1, where this group has neither goals nor an
action plan. With a positive coefficient, this implies that an increase in the oxygen
level of 1mg/l O2 increases the likelihood by 0.06% (from Model 3) of being in the
least ambitious group of municipalities. For Group 3, the most ambitious group, we
observe statistical significance at the 1% level within Models 1 and 2, but at the 5%
Table 1. Descriptive statistics.
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
‘Goal’ 240 0.60 1 0.49 0 1
‘ActionPlan’ 239 0.36 0 0.48 0 1
‘Responsibility’ 233 0.73 1 0.44 0 1
Oxygen content
(mg/l) (Oxy)
175 9.35 9.47 1.31 6.52 12.97
Surface area of
water
(WArea) (km2)
270 416.39 137 940.14 0 12 180
Surface area of
natural reserve
land
(NRArea) (ha)
270 13,357 1,894 63,540 0 557,366
Coastal length
(Coast) (km)
270 38.94 0 94.56 0 531
Population (Pop) 270 33,892 15,662 68,070 2,431 864,324
Average per capita
income
(AvInc) (kSEK)
270 202.32 195 31.27 162 496
‘County’ 231 0.92 1 0.27 0 1
‘IntGroups’ 223 0.76 1 0.43 0 1
‘Business’ 221 0.73 1 0.44 0 1
Number of
farms (Farms)
270 247 193 216 0 1,574
Surface area of
Ag. Land
(FArea) (ha)
270 10,794 7,228 12,440 0 111,132
Center (%) 270 11.22 8.89 0.08 0 38.71
Green (%) 270 4.95 4.88 0.03 0 17.07
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level within Model 3. With a negative coefficient, this would imply that an increase in
the oxygen level by 1mg/l O2, decreases the likelihood of being in Group 3 by 0.06%
(from Model 3).
Different to the foregoing estimations, the multinomial model suggests that the
length of the coastline matters. Coastline is significant at the 5% level within Models
1–3 for Group 3. With a positive coefficient, this implies that adding 1 km to the
coastline increases the log-odds of a municipality being in Group 3 by 0.001%.
Average income is significant at the 5% level for Group 1 in Models 1 and 2 and
at the 10% level in Model 3, see Table 3. With a negative coefficient, this implies that
an increase in average income by 1,000 SEK would decrease the likelihood of being
in the least ambitious group by 3.06% (from Model 3). Significance at the 5% level is
also observed for Group 3 in Models 1 and 2. With a positive coefficient, this implies
that as the level of average income increases by 1,000 SEK, the log-odds likelihood of
being in the most ambitious group increases by 2.67% (from Model 2). No signifi-
cance is observed for population levels, the area of water or nature reserve land, or
variables concerning expertise.
Results are significant at the 1% level in all models for ‘IntGroups’ within Group
1, see Table 3. With a negative coefficient, this implies to us that cooperation with
interest groups reduces the likelihood of being in the least ambitious group by
0.27%. For Group 3, results are significant at the 5% level. The positive coefficient
implies that cooperation with interest groups increases the log-odds likelihood of being
in the most ambitious group by 0.42%.
As seen in Table 3, representation of the Center Party is significant within Group 1, at
the 10% level. A higher share of Center Party representation implies a decreased likeli-
hood of 1.02% for being within Group 1, where municipalities have neither local goals
nor action plans. Significance is also seen for representation of the Center Party within
Group 2 at the 5% level. Here, a higher share of Center Party representation implies an
increased likelihood of 1.51% for being within Group 2, where municipalities have either
local goals or action plans. No significance is observed for the remaining variables.
Table 2. Logistic regression – marginal effects on ‘Goal’ and ‘ActionPlan’.
‘Goal’ ‘ActionPlan’
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Oxy 20.077*** 20.077*** 20.071** 20.081*** 20.080*** 20.059*
WArea (log) 0.034 0.027 0.001 0.038 0.031 0.035
NRArea (log) 0.036 0.033 0.022 0.024 0.009 0.014
Coast 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Pop (log) 0.026 0.006 0.090 0.042 0.023 0.053
AvInc (log) 1.290** 1.434** 0.914 0.858** 0.847* 0.552
Responsibility 0.041 0.067 0.012 0.052
County 0.007 0.009 0.148 0.153
IntGroups 0.273*** 0.271**
Business 0.064 0.005
Farms (log) 0.254** 0.014
FArea (log) 0.157* 0.044
Center 1.003 0.241
Green 1.925 2.259
Note: p < 0.1; p< 0.05; p< 0.01.
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4.4. Who is selected as responsible for goals and action plans?
In Model 1, the impact of water quality on the choice to place the responsibility with
the municipal board is significant at the 10% level, see Table 4. However, the effect is
Table 3. Multinomial logistic regression – marginal effects on the combination of ‘Goal’
and ‘ActionPlan’.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Group 1
–Oxy 0.067*** 0.075*** 0.059**
WArea (log) 0.001 0.000 0.018
NRArea (log) 0.004 0.004 0.002
Coast 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pop (log) 0.013 0.016 0.071
AvInc (log) 1.452** 1.621** 1.118*
Responsibility 0.040 0.056
County 0.097 0.113
IntGroups 0.274***
Business 0.005
Farms (log) 0.170
FArea (log) 0.100
Center 1.016*
Green 2.331
Group 2
Oxy 0.028 0.012 0.001
WArea (log) 0.010 0.017 0.008
NRArea (log) 0.025 0.019 0.020
Coast 0.001 0.001 0.001
Pop (log) 0.019 0.033 0.018
AvInc (log) 0.512 0.639 0.785
Responsibility 0.055 0.114
County 0.310 0.364
IntGroups 0.148
Business 0.125
Farms (log) 0.093
FArea (log) 0.095
Center 1.508**
Green 0.234
Group 3
Oxy 0.095*** 0.087*** 0.060**
WArea (log) 0.010 0.017 0.027
NRArea (log) 0.021 0.023 0.018
Coast 0.001** 0.001** 0.001**
Pop (log) 0.033 0.017 0.053
AvInc (log) 0.940** 0.982** 0.334
Responsibility 0.015 0.058
County 0.213 0.252
IntGroups 0.422**
Business 0.120
Farms (log) 0.076
FArea (log) 0.004
Center 0.492
Green 2.097
Note: p < 0.1; p< 0.05; p< 0.01.
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not significant in Models 2 and 3. Based on Model 1, an increase in the oxygen level
by 1mg/l O2 would imply a decrease in the likelihood of 0.05% for assigning the
responsibility to the municipal board. No significance is observed for the other socioe-
conomic or environmental variables, as well as for collaboration with the county
administration.
Results indicate that the number of farms is also significant at the 10% level. With
a negative sign, this implies that an increase of one farm within a municipality reduces
the likelihood by 1.17% of allocating responsibility to the municipal council board.
Furthermore, the area of farmland is significant at the 10% statistical level. With a
positive sign, this implies that an increase in farmland by 1 km2 increases the likeli-
hood by 1.15% of allocating responsibility to the municipal council board.
Results indicate that higher political representation of the Center Party positively
affects the likelihood of allocating the responsibility to the municipal board, where an
increase of 1% in representation of the Center Party is associated with an increased
likelihood of 1.82% for responsibility being with the municipal board. No significance
is observed for the remaining variables.
4.5. Post-estimation tests
To measure how well the models employed fit with the data, we applied the Hosmer-
Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test (see Appendix, Table A5 [online supplemental data])
which orders the observed data within equally sized groups and then tests whether the
observed event rates match the expected event rates within these subgroups. This is
used instead of the more commonly employed Pearson goodness-of-fit test as the num-
ber of covariate patterns is close to the number of observations which would make the
applicability of the Pearson test questionable (Hosmer, Lemeshow, and Sturdivant
2013). Results for the multinomial logit estimation use the multinomial version of the
Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test detailed in Fagerland and Hosmer (2012), see
Appendix, Table A6 (online supplemental data). Here, a significant result from the
Chi2 statistic would indicate that the model does not have goodness of fit and that
there may be misspecification of the model. From the results presented, we see that no
significant results are seen for any of the estimations. This indicates to us that we
Table 4. Logistic regression – marginal effects on ‘Responsibility’.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Oxy 0.049* 0.044 0.035
WArea (log) 0.012 0.012 0.027
NRArea (log) 0.009 0.003 0.026
Coast 0.001 0.001 0.001
Pop (log) 0.012 0.015 0.010
AvInc (log) 0.466 0.610 0.293
County 0.153 0.131
IntGroups 0.012
Business 0.013
Farms (log) 0.157*
FArea (log) 0.143*
Center 1.815***
Green 2.481
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cannot reject our chosen model for any estimation, indicating that our model fits rea-
sonably well.
To test for multicollinearity, we constructed a correlation matrix, see online supple-
mentary material, Table S1. This matrix shows low correlation between variables, with
the highest correlation standing at 0.55. Furthermore, the centered variance inflation
factors never exceed 10 for our estimations. Hence, we can conclude that our data
does not suffer from multicollinearity issues. Finally, also as a robustness check, probit
models were estimated, and results were similar to those presented above.
Furthermore, certain municipalities have particularly high levels of average income,
coastal length, or surface water area. To test whether the presence of outliers affected
the above results, we implemented a winsorization of the data in order to remove data
points that fall within the upper and lower 1% range. The results for the multinomial
logit estimation with winsorized data are presented in the online supplementary mater-
ial, Table S2. From these results, only two notable changes are seen; representation of
the Green Party is significant at the 10% level within Group 1, with a positive coeffi-
cient, but no significance is seen for representation of the Center Party in Group 1.
Further results for all estimations, however, are similar with and without winsorized
data, implying that outliers do not have a significant impact on our results.
5. Discussion and conclusions
We hypothesized that the choice to implement local environmental goals and action
plans was strongly affected by surface water quality, as well as by the surface water
area and coastal length. Results showed that, out of these, water quality, proxied by
the dissolved oxygen concentration, had the strongest effect, being significant in all
estimated models. Hence, municipalities with poor water quality are more inclined to
adopt local environmental targets and action plans. However, the magnitude of the
effect of dissolved oxygen concentration and coastal length is relatively small. Still,
this result illustrates the observation by Thomann and Sager (2017) that diversity is
inherent in EU implementation, where a one-size-fits-all solution to effective policy
implementation is not appropriate. In this case, a non-uniform implementation of the
WFD, in terms of differences in the development of local environmental targets and
plans, is rational from a societal perspective given the variations in the severity of
water quality degradation across municipalities.
Furthermore, coastal length was significant with respect to explaining municipal-
ities’ choice to have both goals and action plans. This is consistent with national aims
to meet common water quality targets for the Baltic Sea in a cost-efficient manner, as
the impact of measures at sources close to the coast is higher than for upstream sour-
ces, implying that the cost of reducing coastal load is lower for the coastal sources
(Balana, Vinten, and Slee 2011; Rygaard, Binning, and Albrechtsen 2011).
Second, our results show that income, but not population numbers, is significant in
most of the models. Population numbers indicate the size of the social gains from
environmental policy, whereas income rather indicates the willingness and ability to
pay for these gains. Furthermore, higher income can also be associated with higher
administrative capacity to effectively develop plans and goals. The sizable effect of
income raises the question of the fairness of the observed pattern of environmental
policy implementation, as it shows that high-income municipalities provide their citi-
zens with better environmental quality (cf. S€oderberg 2016). This is not consistent
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with the requirements posed by the WFD, which demands water quality policies to be
based on environmental quality. Our results for income are in line with findings in
Grafton and Knowles (2004), who studied the role of social and economic factors for
countries’ performance with respect to a water quality index, and Elofsson and von
Br€omssen (2017), where income is shown to positively affect the likelihood of having
goals defined for agricultural measures that reduce nutrient loads. It is argued that a
strongly decentralized and, hence, non-uniform policy can perform well if local gov-
ernments have a strong autonomy (Oates 2001; Thomann and Sager 2017), such as is
claimed to be the case in Sweden (J€orby 2002; Hysing 2009). However, our results
suggest that such autonomy is not sufficient to secure fair outcomes or maximization
of welfare on the national level.
We hypothesized that the presence of environmental expertise in the policy process
matters for policy development. Contrary to expectations, we did not find any signifi-
cant effect of collaboration with the county board. Neither did we find any evidence
that the decision to allocate the responsibility to lower level committees with a stron-
ger role for professionals mattered for the outcome.
The results indicate that stakeholders affect local environmental policy implementa-
tion. As expected, municipalities with more farms are less inclined to adopt local
environmental goals, while a larger area of farmland has the opposite effect. The first
effect was expected and has support from Andersson (2004) which claims that greater
agricultural activity in a municipality could be negatively correlated with the imple-
mentation of local environmental policy, because the interest of farmers does not
necessarily coincide with that of other municipal citizens. The latter effect was unex-
pected, and our interpretation is that a large farm area might be positively related to
both the political influence of the farm industry, and to environmental impacts, making
the effect on policy implementation ambiguous. In summary, we are not able to draw
any strong conclusions regarding the impact of the farming industry on environmen-
tal policy.
Furthermore, municipalities that collaborate with local interest groups were more
inclined to adopt local environmental targets and action plans, which is in line with
observations in previous literature, where further collaboration is argued to increase
the capacity to evaluate environmental conditions and monitor progress (B€ackstrand
2006; Leach 2006; Gunningham 2009; Levesque, Bell, and Calhoun 2017). However,
we cannot rule out the possibility that the causal relationship could be the opposite:
the initiation of goal and plan development might have led to collaboration, in that
interest groups were invited to participate in drafting those documents.
We also see that municipalities that have higher representation from the Center
Party are less likely to adopt both national targets and action plans, but a higher likeli-
hood of adopting either a goal or an action plan. The observation that a higher repre-
sentation of the Center Party implies a moderately ambitious environmental policy fits
with previous literature (Goldfield 1982; Kirchg€assner and Schneider 2002; Folke
2014) where the party is shown to have a history of compromise at the local level.
Furthermore, we investigated municipalities’ choice to place responsibility for
environmental policy with the municipal council board or a lower level committee.
Results suggest that municipalities with a larger area of farmland but fewer numbers
of farms, hence with larger farms, have a higher propensity to place the responsibility
with the municipal council, hence making the policy process a political rather than an
administrative issue. This could potentially imply a stronger role in the policy process
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for concerns for the economic viability of the farm industry (cf. Eckerberg 1997).
Finally, municipalities with higher representation of the Center Party within the muni-
cipal council are more inclined to assign responsibility for environmental goal setting
with the municipal council. This result fits in with predictions made by earlier litera-
ture (Kirchg€assner and Schneider 2002), where the Center Party is ideologically moti-
vated through their aims for decentralized governance (Linde 2010). In comparison,
we observe no statistical impact from Green Party representation. This contrasts with
observations in Folke (2014), who concludes that the party’s representation has a con-
siderable impact on a regularly produced survey-based environmental ranking of
municipalities. The difference in results could be due to methodological differences,
where Folke (2014) investigates the effect of the marginal seats allocated to parties in
the municipal council, where the allocation of those seats is treated as random, while
environmental and socioeconomic conditions are not accounted for. Given the observa-
tion from this study that such conditions matter for policy implementation, future stud-
ies aiming to study party effects could benefit from combining the approaches.
Important limitations of our study include the use of cross-sectional data, and the
exclusion of spatial effects in local policy development. Both causality and spillovers
could be further explored with panel data, and efforts to develop such datasets would,
therefore, be valuable.
Based on our results, we recommend that national policy makers further consider
whether fairness and compliance with the uniform water quality requirements posed by
the WFD, should be prioritized above economic efficiency. If fairness and WFD
requirements are seen as more important, this needs to be further addressed in the pol-
icy design.
Notes
1. Taken as part of an overall study conducted with results in SKL (2012).
2. Alternative measures of water quality, such as phosphorus (P) and nitrogen (N) content,
were not included because they cannot be seen as independent from dissolved oxygen
content (Carpenter et al. 1998), and, hence, estimates from logit would be imprecise (Woo
et al. 2014).
3. For the regressions with ‘Responsibility’ as a dependent variable, the same variable is
excluded from the right-hand side of Equation (2).
4. The survey questions can be found in the online supplementary material.
5. Available at www.miljodata.slu.se/mvm/.
6. Net income is the sum of an individual’s all taxable and tax-free income less taxes and
other negative transfers (such as repaid student loans).
7. 1 SEK ¼ 0.11 EUR, according to Riksbank statistics (2011) for annual average
exchange rates.
8. Statistics Sweden – www.scb.se.
9. Board of Agriculture – www.jordbruksverket.se.
10. Swedish Election Authority – www.val.se.
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